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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The art of Theater makes any part of the world a stage for a
time, if only the people around the new stage know how to give
it their attention. Then the two sides help each other bring off a
successful time of watching and being watched. (Woodruff,
2008, p. 4)

My 6-year-old nephew discovers he has mastered a new trick:

completing a summersault underwater in a neighbor's pool. Beaming, he
demands everyone's attention as he demonstrates his newfound skill. After
the second aquatic flip, his aunt thinks to grab her iPhone and record the

event to capture and share with those who are absent (namely me...and

possibly Facebook).

In the video can be seen the child flipping, his feet

cresting then submerging before his head comes back around. There are

splashes, laughter and congratulations from off screen voices representing
unseen people. The video freezes on a grinning boy ready to move on to a
new adventure.

The boy has (unwittingly) committed an act of theatre, according to
Paul Woodruff who asserts that "we see theater all around us if we open our

eyes to what lies beyond the boundaries of fine art" (2008, p. 17). While the
performance is not an instance of conventional "art theatre" on a stage with a
paying audience, it nonetheless satisfies Peter Brook's classic definition of a
space, a person to move through it, and someone else to watch (1968, p. 9).
This figuration is further defined by Woodruff as "the art by which human
beings make or find human action worth watching, in a measured time and
place" (p. 18). Furthermore, theatre is an important human activity because,
1

as Woodruff points out, "ifwe are unwatched we diminish, and we cannot be

entirely as we wish to be. If we never stop to watch, we will know only how
it feels to be us, never know how it might feel to be another...Watching well,

together, and being watched well, with limits on both sides, we grow, and
grow together" (p. 10). These twin actions, watching and being watched,
are—according to this line of thought—necessary to our development as

caring, empathetic, human beings. Woodruff asserts that theatre helps us
learn to attend to others, to identify with a community, and become fully
human.

Philosopher and pedagogue John Dewey shared Woodruff's concerns.
In fact, to cultivate the operation of theatre as a fundamental human need, we

must recognize that theatre is a larger concept than the narrow, traditional
definition of drama as a literary field, or art theatre as one of the fine arts

which have become set apart from everyday life.

This conception is

developed in Dewey's aesthetic philosophy. Dewey believed that isolating
the fine arts from everyday life was detrimental to the "significant life of an

organized community" (1934, p. 7) and is a symptom of the
"compartmentalization of life" and hierarchical classification that he observed
in our world (p. 20). The physical manifestation of this separation is the
museum. When an art product is placed on a wall or otherwise canonized as
a classic, it is decontextualized from "the human conditions under which it

was brought into being and from the human consequences it engenders in
actual life-experience" (p. 3). Inessence, what Dewey is saying here is that art
tends to be rendered as an object (a sculpture, sonata, play, or dance piece),

put on a pedestal as "fine art" and thus is cut off from attaining its fulfillment

as significant experience. In other words, it does not achieve its full potential
as experience, and we as perceivers of the artwork are robbed of an
opportunity for meaningful engagement and growth.
Dewey observed that most of our everyday life is a fragmented stream
of events which we "undergo" and the speed at which random distractions

compete for our attention interrupt our experiences from attaining full
meaning (p. 45). He believed that the more we are able to have full, rich

experiences, the more full our lives will be. And the key to cultivating an

experience is the aesthetic quality which endows the experience with a unity
and consummation. He even applies this distinction to the realm of politics,
wherein "the conditions that create the gulf which exists generally between

producer and consumer in modern society operate to create also a chasm
between ordinary and esthetic experience" (p. 10). Similar concerns have
been raised since the rise of computers and virtual technologies by thinkers

such as Sherry Turkle who, in her book Alone Together (2011), observed that
"overwhelmed by the volume and velocity ofour lives, weturn to technology

to help us find time. But technology makes us busier than ever and ever more
in search ofretreat. Gradually, we come to see our online life aslife itself" (p.
17). This condition oflife leads me to the central question of this thesis: How

can embodied aesthetic experience enhance our lives in a mediatized culture?
Meaningful experiences can be developed through active engagement
with works of art, because to Dewey, "art is an event of participation that

weaves artworks and appreciators into especially satisfying experiences."
(Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 6, Art as Experience, para. 1). Dewey asks us to tear

down the wall separating our lives from art, reconnecting the context of

artistic production with that of aesthetic appreciation. Thomas Alexander, in
his treatment of Dewey's theory (1987), summarizes this connection: "the
work of art is an event and cannot be innocently confused with the physical
object which is a condition for the experience. There is no work of art apart

from the human experience" of it (p. 187).
So, how might we embark on developing aesthetic experience in a
modern world dominated by media technologies that fragment and speed up

our lives?

How might the recognition and cultivation of theatre as a

necessary part of life be achieved when so much is performed on screens?

This brings us to the second part of my thesis and a significant feature of my
original example of the boy in the pool: its mediatization.

By recording the live, uninhibited moment, it has become mediated by

a technological means, the camera-device. By uploading the video onto the
web, the boy's aunt has unwittingly admitted his otherwise ephemeral action
to the realm of the mediatized. Because the recorded image is not "live," is it

less authentic? Is the joy of those watching the moment after-the-fact altered
by experiencing it as an image on a screen which necessarily brackets out
much of the environment? If those remote viewers had been present at the

event, would the performance have been altered? Am I missing an essential
element of the experience of the moment by watching it on my computer

screen miles away from the pool and long after the proud swimmer has gone
to sleep? Or does the moment's recordability solidify its authenticity?
As our world becomes mediatized, a discourse is needed that takes

account of the changes in perception required of the occupant of a mediatized
environment.

Johannes Birringer has been an instrumental force in

documenting and intensifying academic interest in what is now termed

"digital performance" (2008, p. xii).

He claims, rightly, that digital

technology "has altered artistic practices and aesthetic experiences" (p. xvixvii) and goes on to assert that "the traditional paradigm of theatre is
transformed" by such technologies (p. xviii). He asserts that the ongoing

proliferation of digital interfaces in our lives has "replaced stage presence
with online presence" (ibid). The question of presence and authenticity is a
central and oft-debated topic, which is summed up by Steve Dixon, who in

Digital Performance (2007), provides the context for this exploration and
reinforces the need for this dialogue:

The sense of technology having transformed or destabilized
notions of liveness, presence, and the 'real' is at the core of a
long-lasting debate within performance studies, and is equally
important in broader cultural theory, (p. 127)
I intend to contribute to this debate by bringing to the table the

aesthetic theory of John Dewey and his emphasis on embodied experience,
which I believe can offer a fresh perspective on the issue. While Dewey's

aesthetics have appeared only episodically in the discourse on aesthetics in

the last half century, I agree with Richard Shusterman (2001) who asserts that

Dewey's "crucial insights usually lacking in the analytic tradition...point to

the most promising future we can envisage for aesthetic inquiry" (p. 128).
Furthermore, Dewey provides a fitting framework for our inquiry precisely
because of his conception of aesthetic experience which joins the various parts

of any given experience into a unified whole and supports Woodruff's
assertion of theatre's centrality to culture.

CHAPTER n

PERCEPTION AND TECHNOLOGY

Defining Mediatization

Contemporary society is permeated by the media, to an extent
that the media may no longer be conceived of as being separate
from cultural and other social institutions. (Hjarvard, 2008, p.
105)

The idea that the media is encroaching into every aspect of life is not a
new phenomenon.

In fact media technologies share a lineage with

technological advancement dating back to before the industrial age. In his

prescient essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,"
Walter Benjamin observed:
The mode of human sense perception changes with humanity's
entire mode of existence.

The manner in which human sense

perception is organized, the medium in which it is
accomplished, is determined not only by nature but by
historical circumstances as well. (1968, p. 222)
The view that human perception is contextual and has been shaped
over time by "historical circumstances," particularly advances in technology,

is supported by the common belief that travel by train, and later automobiles
and airplanes, significantly altered our perception of time; when long
distances could be traversed at high speeds, time became relative to our

perception of it. Lewis Mumford traced our perception of time even further
back to the invention of the clock, which he posited in his essay "The

Monastery and the Clock" (1934) as the most influential machine of the
industrial era due to its ability to punctuate and separate portions of the day

and thus it "dissociated time from human events and helped to create the

belief in an independent world of mathematically measurable sequences (p.
14-15).

Sociologist John B. Thompson (1990, 1995), attributed a gradual
alteration in perception to mass media when he stated that the condition of
modern society has been shaped in part by the development of
communication media technologies, from the printing press onward.

Furthermore, Valery prophesied cable TV and the internet when he predicted
a time when "we shall be supplied with visual or auditory images, which will
appear and disappear at a simple movement of the hand, hardly more than a

sign" (quoted in Benjamin, p. 219). Benjamin went a step further by asserting
that reproduction through the technologies of photography, radio, and film

fundamentally altered not only the perceptual faculties we employ but also
the nature of art.

When images, sounds, and video (recorded and "live" alike) are
available at our fingertips, streamed instantly into devices that can fit in our

pockets, the technologies that structure our everyday lives have undoubtedly
altered our forms of communication and the ways in which we perceive the
world. All levels of social, cultural, and communal engagement have been

affected by a parade of textual and image-based media and by technological

modes of representation (magazines, television, billboards, the internet, etc.)
that deliver them to our fields of perception. This shift in perception is

intrinsically connected to the mediatization of society.

The concept of mediatization as a socio-cultural process has been

employed in a variety of contexts within modern, post-modern, sociological,
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and cultural theories, yet only in the past decade has an effort been
undertaken to assemble the various uses of the term into a coherent definition

by Danish media theorist Stig Hjarvard (2002, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2008).
Hjarvard maps existing ideas around the concept of mediatization and forms
them into a single sociological definition. He states that mediatization is a
"long-lasting process, whereby social and cultural institutions and modes of
interaction are changed as a consequence of the growth of the media's
influence" (2008, p. 114). The mediatization of society is evident in the

omnipresence of media in today's world and its position as "an independent
institution that stands between other cultural and social institutions and

coordinates their mutual interaction" (p. 106).

Media (that is to say,

technologies of communication) have not only amalgamated into a social
institution, they have also permeated the realm of other institutions such as
politics, science, law, and art.

He goes on to identify two types of mediatization: direct and indirect.
These two types are distinct from one another for the purpose of analysis,

though they do not necessarily operate in isolation. Direct (or "strong")
mediatization is characterized by transformation. This transformation occurs

when a non-mediated activity or object is adapted to a mediated form, such

as traditional games like chess, which have been converted into computerized
versions (2008, p. 114-5). In this case, even though the rules remain the same,

the activity of playing the game is fundamentally changed when you make
moves by typing on a keyboard instead of moving physical pieces. Whereas,
indirect (or "weak") mediatization occurs "when a given activity is

increasingly influenced with respect to form, content, or organization by

mediagenic symbols or mechanisms," but the ways the activity are performed

are not necessarily affected (p. 115). To illustrate indirect mediatization,
Hjarvard offers the example of a visit to a fast food restaurant where the

cultural context of the patron is altered; images of cartoon characters greet
you and the sale of toys derived from animated films connects the experience
of the restaurant with a larger media context.

Though this form of

mediatization may alter one's choices, either consciously or unconsciously

(i.e. purchasing a meal with the toy instead of one without), the actual
processes of ordering and eating are not directly changed (ibid).
By now we can see that this concept is distinct from simple
"mediation," which is an act of communication through a given medium

(telephone, book, e-mail, television broadcast, text message, etc.) within a
certain social context. It is important to point out that the message itself as

well as the relationship between communicators are indeed affected by the
choice of medium (thank you, McLuhan); however, mediation will not
necessarily have a transformational effect on the social institution or context

wherein it is used, in the way that mediatization does (Hjarvard, 2008, p. 114).
For instance in the case of political speech, the video recording and broadcast

of a speech (mediation) has resulted in politicians adapting their language to
speak in "sound bites" hoping they will be immune to misrepresentation
when edited and replayed (a result of mediatization).

In Liveness: Performance in a mediatized culture (2008), performance

theorist Philip Auslander writes at length about mediatization and its effects
on various forms of theatre, from the traditional stage to rock concerts and

courtrooms. He grounds his argument in the postmodern tradition generally,
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and the writing of Baudrillard in particular.

Our use of the term

mediatization will follow that of Auslander, referring to "the mediatized" as

cultural objects that are products of the mass media or of media technology

(p. 4). He admits to a loose adaptation of Baudrillard who, in Requiem for the
Media, claims "what is mediatized is not what comes off the daily press, out

of the tube, or on the radio; it is what is reinterpreted by the sign form,

articulated into models, and administered by the code" (1981, 175-6). While

largely ignoring Baudrillard's more political focus on mediated reality as an
overarching semiotic code of simulation, Auslander maintains that the mass
media is a dominant force in "contemporary western(ized) societies" and

extends this dominant to encompass cultural, and specifically art products, an
area Baudrillard omitted from his analysis (p. 5).

The impact of mediatization on artistic expression was first posited by
Frederic Jameson, who identified a hierarchy among art forms and a new self-

reflectivity of art on it's own mediatization: "the traditional fine arts...now
come to consciousness of themselves as various media within a mediatic

system in which their own internal production also constitutes a symbolic
message and the taking of a position on the status of the medium in question"
(1991, 162). According to this view, the fine arts are now part of a cultural

system that includes and is in fact defined by mass media, rather than

operating in an independent cultural economy.

Furthermore, arts'

positioning in that system implies self-reflective expression about ifs place
within the system. In this view, any expression of theatre can no longer be

simply theatre; it also comments on its relationship toThe Media. This theory
informs much of Auslander's argument with regards to the place of
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performance within a mediatized culture.
Is it Live, Or...

To foreground mediatized interactions, they must be distinguished
from the live. The common understanding of what it means to be "live" as it

relates to performance is that the performance is happening in real-time, or in
the shared present time between the performer and the spectator. Whether
this happens in a shared space is a more complicated topic.
"Live theatre"

Certainly, for the bulk of human history, the only kind of performance

in existence was live performance; before the development of technologies of

reproduction, there was no need to mark an event as a "live" event. Indeed
the same can be said of presence in such events: before broadcast television
and radio, one was necessarily present in the same space as the performers in

order to experience it. Therefore, we can see that the very definition of "live

performance" is historically contingent and reliant on alternatives to the live
event. This historical development has created a need to examine further the
concept of "liveness."

Peter Brook's definition of live performance (or theatre) indicates that

it is happening live, in a shared spatial-temporal present. This definition has
been embraced and reiterated time and again by performance theorists and

practitioners. However, this emphasis on thenecessity ofpresence toliveness
has become increasingly complicated by the expansion of multi- and inter

medial theatre pieces. Therefore, a more articulated definition is needed that
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accounts for the new complexities of our mediatized world.

Woodruff

provides such a definition as he explicates the concept of theatre in great

length: On the most basic level, theatre ("human action being watched")
requires a "measured time and space" (2008, p. 38-9). While this definition
does not yet necessarily require a shared presence, it does set out a frame for

the performance; "marking off space in theatre is a device for meeting the
need to distinguish the watcher from the watched" (p. 110). The closest
Woodruff comes to answering the question of whether this space needs to be

live is by delineating the difference between theatre and film. While he does
concede that "the showing of a film is a kind of performance" (p. 44) and that

"a presentation of film may be used, properly framed, in a live theatrical
performance", he insists that the fundamental difference between the two art
forms is that theatre is essentially a live performance (p. 43). The liveness of

the performance is integral to theatre because "the arts of watching and being
watched are intertwined, and each affects the other" through the interaction

between performer and audience who are complicit in making the action
worth watching, whereas "the art of filmmaking seeks to make thefilm worth

watching, not the action it is supposed to represenf' (p. 43, emphasis added).
The necessity of presence to the impact of live performance is

reinforced by Erika Fischer-Lichte who, in her 2008 book The Transformative
Power of Performance, argues that "what the spectators see and hear in

performance is always present.

Performance is experienced as the

completion, presentation, and passage of the presenf (p. 94). This notion
contends that the very definition of performance is based on presence,

making Brook and Woodruff's claims to presence in performance explicit.
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Thus, we can see that the concept of presence is integral to delineating
liveness and deserves a thorough exploration.
Concerning Presence

Theorists like Walter Benjamin have considered presence a "material,

auratic, proximal 'real'" property of experience; while more recent theories

(like that of Birringer mentioned above) have extended its meaning "to

include ideas of telematic and deferred, online presence" (Dixon, p. 132),

wherein physical presence is implied through mediated words and/or images.
We will examine this distinction further, but let us begin by establishing the

basic definition of the term, which may be more difficult than one might
think.

When speaking of presence in relation to theatre and performance, the
discussion inevitably narrows to "stage presence."

The concepts of

"presence" and "stage presence," often used interchangeably, have a large
volume of literature devoted to their definition and description. For clarity,
our first task will be to delineate these terms. While "stage presence" is a

description limited to performers, the term "presence," in contrast, is broader,

referring simply to the perceived existence of a person or thing in a specific

physical and temporal relationship with the subject. As Erikson (in Krasner
& Saltz, 2006) reminds us, there are a number of ways that we perceive

presence and any consideration of it must take account of "how it functions

within a specific context, how it motivates, and to what end" (p. 156). In this

spirit, we must recognize the distinctions between the performer (one who is
watched or witnessed), the audience (those who witness), and the participant
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(one who is watched even as watching). As we will see, presence is often
conceived as an active process that complicates the relationship between
these subjects. In keeping with this dynamism, we will begin by elucidating
the concept of presence as experience, practice, medium, and process.
Presence as Experience

An etymological analysis is offered by Giannachi and Kaye (2011) who
trace the original meaning of the word through its Latin roots, which
translates to "before I am." They go on to suggest that the term "presence"

relates to that which is not only a state of being and a spatial-temporal
condition, but it also has a social dimension, as one that is present "to

something else or in the presence of something else," making it a cultural
concept as well (p. 5). This analysis also establishes the phrase "being

present" as existing both in time and space (ibid), an idea contested by some
who insist that presence can be felt through technological media like the
telephone, video or text chat, and text message.
Jane Goodall corroborates the temporal-spatial definition in her book

Stage Presence (2008) by tracing notions of presence through human history
and outlining the way "having presence" was first linked with the

supernatural, the sublime, and the uncanny. This connotation is linked to the
divine in the Christian tradition; "presence" marked one who was closer to

(read "in the presence of") God. "We talk of 'sensing' a presence...A human

being with presence may be said to have an aura" (p. 7). In this original
sense, being present implies the authentic aura of which Benjamin was so
fond. Goodall also connects this aura to the dimension of time, wherein we
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may sense the "energy field" of a person with presence as they approach, "or
feel that they've been here, after they've gone" (p. 7-8).

The perception of an aura presupposes the existence of a physical body

in space and a perception of a qualitative, material difference when two or
more bodies are physically present to each other. Many historical definitions

of presence depend upon this concrete characterization of presence. One
recent account is by Jon Erikson (in Krasner and Saltz, 2006) whose central

argument is a defense of presence which has a recognizable materiality that
"has to do with a certain kind of saturation of feeling or thought in the
individual" (p. 146).

An alternative view is offered by Dixon who, similar to Auslander,

argues that presence, or "presentness" is a fundamental feature of all art when
we engage with it; "in purely semiotic terms, there is no significant difference
between the image of, for example, a woman wearing a revolutionary flag as
described in a novel, painted on a canvas, screened in a cinema, or standing

live onstage" (Dixon, p. 132). From this point of view, any claim to the

uniqueness of live performance is merely a fetishization or statement of
preference. A second issue is that "presence is about interest and command
of attention, not space or liveness" (ibid). Therefore, the measure of presence

is dependent on the work of art's ability to engage the viewer, which puts all
forms on a level playing field because our focus will be pulled to the

representation (be it live performer or televisual image) which is more

interesting to us as spectators. The representation of choice will be privileged

by the individual spectator who focuses her attention on it. "Something is
said to have presence when it demands that the beholder take it into account,
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that he take it seriously" (Fried, quoted in Dixon, p 134). In other words,
presence is created by the content, not the vehicle.
Presence as Practice

To discuss the practice of presence, we must venture for a moment to

the specific domain of stage presence, which may exist on an actual stage or

figurative one.

Stage presence has variously been defined as a type of

charisma (Auslander, Erikson), technical skill (Phelan, Goodall, Jaeger), or

authoritative domination (Auslander), often a quality which certain people

possess and others seek to cultivate through training. Goodall (2008), traces
the origin of this concept to its use in describing the classical actor, as a term
that entails "command over the time and space of performance" (p. 15) and

describes the capacity to bring "a heightened level of vital power" to that
space (p. 158). Such a command may be innate or achieved through any

variety of training methods, as evidenced by the history of actor training,
from the Renaissance forward (Goodall, p. 9). It is worthwhile pointing out—
as Fischer-Lichte has done—that in the practice of presence, there

undoubtedly is a continuum from the weak (simply a body in space) to the
strong (commanding and holding attention), and even a 'radical' presence
wherein "what occurred in an action or performance always really happened
in the present (2008, p. 97).

Patrice Pavis supports this claim in the Dictionnaire du Theatre (1983)
where he states "To have presence' in theatrical parlance, is to know how to

capture the attention of the public and make an impression; it is also to be
endowed with a je ne sais quoi which triggers an immediate feeling of
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identification in the spectator, communicating a sense of living elsewhere and
in an eternal present" (p. 301). Two key concepts arise in this definition:
attention and identification. Many actor training techniques since the time of
Stanislavsky have included the practice of focusing one's attention as a
foundational element of a strong performance and a way of bringing oneself,
and thus the audience, into a shared state of concentration. The idea that

identification with a performer onstage is a result of co-presence becomes
problematic if the only way to describe the process is "je ne sais quoi." This
description points toward an inability to accurately characterize the
experience of co-presence on the part of the spectator. Goodall positions this

mystery at the center of her exploration of the experience of presence.
Goodall's second connotation of presence is that of "worldly presence"

which can be developed through "training and technical prowess" (2008, p.
8). Despite the tension between the worldly and the mysterious, Goodall
insists that they inform one another and, though actor training has often

sought ways to scientifically reconstruct mesmeric qualities of presence in

performance, "there is no getting away from the strange and the uncanny" (p.
11) when aesthetic experience moves the spectator in ways they can neither

quantify nor articulate through language. Rather than demystify presence,

Goodall challenges us to explore "just how this mysterious attribute has been
articulated" (p. 7).
Presence as Process and Medium

Giannachi and Kaye also refer to presence as approaching the

uncanny, but from a uniquely phenomenological perspective. Their account
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of presence eschews the Cartesian duality of object and subject, opting for a
more dynamic conception of the 'ecology' of presence as a flow or an

unfolding of that which is "I am" in relation to that which is 'in front of or
'before'. For them, presence is an active process; the other is presented to the

subject (the 'I am') and through this presentation there is an unfolding of
identity within and between each which creates a tension experienced as
what Freud referred to as the 'uncanny.' In other words, "what is in front of
or before the T am', returns to the T am', and thus discloses, in this

movement, that which was contained in the T am' but was 'always already'

secret to it" (2011, p. 7). This recurrence to the Freudian figuration of the

uncanny positions presence as both an active process and the medium of

performance. It is through this mutual unfolding that we attend to and
identify with others and recognize truths about ourselves through them.
Furthermore, because presence is characterized as an interaction
between self, other, and environment that is fraught with tension, it is distinct
from an aura or charisma, both of which indicate ease, comfort, and

attraction. This tension is liminal as well as "dynamic and shifting," since it

takes place "within temporary networks and ecologies" (p. 20). Giannachi

and Kaye eschew conceptions of presence which pit mediated and
unmediated presence against one another in an oppositional duality. Instead

they argue, after Derrida, that the liminal nature of the unfolding process

implies that presence as a process is performed, or "produced in the act" and
hence is not intrinsic to any particular medium, then "there is no a priori

opposition between media (theatrical, electronic, or other) with regard to

'presence'" (p. 19). This view resists the privileging of unmediated over
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mediated phenomena of presence and opens up the opportunity for inquiry
into the use of media and technology to explore the performance of presence.
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CHAPTER IE

THE LIVENESS PROBLEM

In Digital Performance (2007), Steve Dixon undertakes a titanic effort to

catalog the history and elucidate the essential features of "new media
technologies and their application within the performance arts."

While

theatre and other performance arts have always integrated new technologies,

the rise of the computer and various new modes of representation and
interaction have invariably given rise to new questions about the nature of
performance.

"Digital performance is an extension of a continuing history of
the adoption and adaptation of technologies to increase
performance and visual art's aesthetic effect and sense of
spectacle, its emotional and sensorial impact, its play of
meanings and symbolic associations, and its intellectual power"
(p. 40).

Dixon painstakingly traces the lineage of digital performance in both
mainstream and avant-garde performance traditions; a lineage that parallel's

the development of computer arts in general, as evidenced by Oliver Grau's
Virtual Art and other works which trace the role of immersive artworks in the

prefiguring of cyberspace (p. 40).

In the chapter titled "Liveness," Dixon posits that this concept has
been "a perennial theoretical problem since it divided critics and theatregoers

almost a century ago following the incorporation of film footage into live
theatre, and it remains a conundrum that is continually wrestled with both in

performance studies and in wider cultural and cyber theory" (p. 115). His
exploration begins by presenting the most prominent ideas by theorists on
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opposing sides of the debate, starting with reactions to the innovation of
photography, a technology which—more than any other—formed the
foundation of the problem of presence. At odds in the argument over the
ontology of photography and its relation to presence and liveness are Walter
Benjamin and Roland Barthes.
Auras and Emanations

Dixon describes Walter Benjamin's seminal essay as "one of the most

cited texts in theoretical discussions of digital arts and culture" (p. 116). As

explained in "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction,"
Benjamin firmly believed that the ability to "mechanically reproduce" works
of art through means of lithography, photography, or film brought about new

considerations regarding the nature of art. He briefly traces the history of

pictorial forms of reproduction from stamps and coins up to photography,
which was the largest technological leap forward in this domain. He explains

how burgeoning technologies of reproduction have, over time, sped up the

process of delivery of images (and later accompanied by sound in film) to our
senses. While this process has made art more accessible to the masses, it has
also undermined the authenticity of the art works themselves.

For Benjamin, the authenticity of an art product is inextricably linked

to its physical presence: "the presence of the original is the prerequisite to the
concept of authenticity" (p. 220). And an object's authenticity, uniqueness,
links to tradition, and historical authority are jointly defined as its "aura."
Therefore, no matter how beautiful or technically similar the reproduction,

"the quality of [the original's] presence is always depreciated" (p. 221).
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Benjamin cites the decay of aura as based on two social circumstances: 1)
"the desire of contemporary masses to bring things 'closer' spatially and

humanly" and 2) the desire to overcome "the uniqueness of every reality by
accepting its reproduction" (p. 223).

Film has presented an equal challenge to performance as photography

did to painting. Here, it is the presence and aura of the actor that is displaced
by the camera:

"the artistic performance of a stage actor is definitely

presented to the public by the actor in person; that of the screen actor,
however, is presented by a camera" (p. 228). The resulting consequence is

that the actor's performance is not seen as a whole once it is submitted to
close-ups, contrived camera angles, and editing. Perhaps more importantly,
"the film actor lacks to opportunity of the stage actor to adjust to the audience

during his performance" therefore, the "audience's identification with the
actor is really an identification with the camera" (p. 228). Here we see the

most profound impact on the spectator who becomes a voyeur into the lives
of those onscreen rather than an active participant in a live exchange between
living bodies in real time and space.

Benjamin's argument frequently underpins many performance
theorists' "warning of the insidious and destructive power of technology"

(p.117). It is certainly apparent that Benjamin is quite attached to authenticity
in art. Yet, it is easy to elide (as many scholars tend to do) Benjamin's
admission that a photograph, taken as such, has its own brand of aura that is

different, yet not less than the image's referent. In fact, he asserts that
mechanical reproduction has altered the ontology (without necessarily

implying a change in value) of art products: "the work of art reproduced
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becomes the work of art designed for reproducibility" (p. 224). This is a point
which Auslander (2008) seizes on for his own theory of liveness, positing
"that all performance modes, live or mediatized, are now equal: none is

perceived as auratic or authentic; the live performance is just one more

reproduction of a given text or one more reproducible text" (p. 55). Thus we
can see how Benjamin's critique has been used to support both sides of the
argument:

"On the one hand, it stands as evidence for the unique aura and
presence of live performance, which can only be damaged and
robbed by technology, and on the other as proof that
technological incursion does not significantly alter reception of

performance, since our minds are already mediatized" (Dixon,
p. 117-8).
Ultimately, in postmodern theory, reproductions are prized as much as, if not
more than, any original thus displacing notions of originality and authenticity
(Dixon, p. 18).
In contrast, Barthes' take on the phenomenon of the photograph is

quite different. He sees a photograph not as a signal of the dismantling of

presence, but rather as "authentication itself...every photograph is a certificate
of presence" (quoted in Dixon, p. 118). In other words, the photographic
documentation of a moment in time authenticates its reality, confirms that it

actually happened. In fact, he goes as far as to say that we are looking at the
referent itself, not the photograph; meaning the essence of a photograph is

only to be a reference to something real and thus is not real itself (p. 120).
The more compelling portion of Barthes' theory (which has

paradoxically been omitted from most of the subsequent liveness debate) has
to do with his insistence that Photography's ability to attest for real,
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unrepeatable moments and authenticate those moments exceeds its ability to

represent. In other words, the fact of my nephew's aquatic agility was proven
true by the video, which is more important than the existence of the video
itself.

This is where Barthes most sharply disagrees with Benjamin, by

denying the Photograph's force as a mode of reproduction. He sees the

Photograph as "an emanation of a past reality: a magic, not an art" (in Dixon, p.
121). The moment is dead because it has passed, but the recording lives on
and is more captivating than the event it recorded. In relating Barthes' views

to digital performance, the photographic image would be seen as more
powerful than the live performer when both are utilized in a performance; "it
is often the media projection rather than the live performer that wields the

real power, the sense of (aesthetic, semiotic) reality" (p. 122). Yet his theory
also implies that the integration of photographic elements into live

performance does not dehumanize or fragment reality, but rather affirms
both reality and humanity.
Performance in a Mediatized Culture

In the preface to the second edition of his book, Liveness, Philip
Auslander indicates that he intended it to be contentious, a "conversation-

starter" (1999, p. xiii) and the responses to it have proven this intention true.
It is beyond the scope of this paper to fully explicate all of the ongoing
conversations around the thorny concept of liveness that Auslander posits, so

to start, let us outline his argument and build the foundation for a response.
From the start, Auslander admits to a belief in an oppositional conflict
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between theatre and the media. However, he challenges the notion of this

binary, which he views as reductive and leads to an assumption that "the live
event is 'real' and that mediatized events are secondary and somehow

artificial reproductions of the real" (p. 3).

He forms his challenge by

deconstructing the inter-medial relationships, examining how various modes

of representation remediate each other, and by unpacking "the mutual

dependence of the live and mediatized" (p. 11).

Following Marshall

McLuhan's theories of the logic of media, wherein, "a new medium is never
an addition to an old one, nor does it leave the old one in peace. It never

ceases to oppress the older media until it finds new shapes and positions for
them" (1964, 158). This idea is advanced by Jay Bolter and Richard Grusin,

who explicated the process of remediation which entails "the representation of
one medium in another.. .new technologies of representation proceed by

reforming or remediating earlier ones" (1996, 339). Historical instances of
remediation, a form of direct mediatization, can tell us much about the

relationship between live and mediatized forms.

In developing his argument, Auslander asserts that while both film
and television remediate structural elements of live performance (narrative,

visual vocabulary, a proscenium-like frame), television remediated theatre at

a deeper, ontological level by presenting itself as a live medium that could
broadcast images of seemingly co-existent and ephemeral moments in a faroff studio or location. Television's "claim to immediacy" informs its ontology

and the way we perceive its content; it has, in Auslander7s words "colonized
liveness" (1999, p. 13). Television thus shares a closer ontological relationship
with theatre through their mutual ability to represent live moments. Whereas

26

film is a medium of repetition, since it can be recorded at any time and place,

then shown at any time and place (p. 15); thus it is of the past, not of the "live"
present the way television and theatre can be. Even when not presented as a
live broadcast and when cinematic techniques were introduced in a
storytelling capacity, television shows were continually theatricalized by

adopting theatrical titles such as "playhouse" and breaking down episodes
into acts and scenes with titles; television, in effect, replaced theatre by

bringing its content to spectators in their private home space (p. 22). This
effect can be extended to new media forms where "the ideology of liveness

that the televisual (the cultural dominant that is now expressed through a

variety of media) inherited from television (the medium) has enabled it to
displace and replace live performance in a wide variety of cultural contexts"
(p. 24).

While early television set out to replicate and replace theatre, "live

performance itself has developed since that time toward the replication of the
discourse of mediatization" (p. 24). This view is supported by Bolter and
Grusin, who comment on the reciprocal nature of remediation, where "earlier

technologies are struggling to maintain their legitimacy by remediating
newer ones" (1996, 352). Auslander goes so far as to suggest that in many

contexts, live performances have become almost completely media products,

citing examples of arena concerts, comedy shows, and sporting events where

spectators only hear what is mediated through speakers and watch most of
the event on a giant screen (1999, p. 25). Televisual conventions such as closeups and instant replays are expected by spectators of large sporting events
and the structure of the event has been altered to create "media time-outs"
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that allow for commercials aired throughout the televised event (p. 25-26).
Professional theatre also continues to design scenery integrating projections,
computerized "smart lights," microphones on every actor, and stagings that

increasingly incorporate cinematic vocabularies to accommodate an audience
that has been raised watching screens.

To support his argument, Auslander co-opts Benjamin's assertion that

works of art are designed for reproducibility.

He does so by providing

examples of direct mediatization that go beyond integration of multi-media
in the performance itself to the process of creation. For instance, there are

increasing cases of performance artists documenting and webcasting their
process at every step through blogs, photography, and video. Such activities
are often intended to draw attention to the art works as commodities and

thus sell more tickets (or copies).
While many of his points, including his historical reading of the

development of media, may be valid, a close reader of Liveness will notice

some underlying assumptions that can be challenged. For one, Auslander's

argument is based on an economic framework; he tends to relate all aspects of
art-making to either a cultural or monetary economy. This orientation is

apparent in his reference to Jacques Attali, who delineated the bases of
cultural economy as representation (a singular act) and repetition (massproduced products) (in Auslander, 1999, 27-8). This delineation is most
apparent in popular music where a concert is a representation, whereas a CD
or mp3 is an example of repetition; the same could be said of recorded theatre

or dance performances and art exhibits vs. posters. From this framework,
Auslander points out that "by being recorded and becoming mediatized,
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performance becomes an accumulable value" (p. 28) and thus live theatre is
more and more reliant on the monetary economy through mediatization. For
example, one only needs to look at the Broadway marquees ranging from
Disney's Beauty and the Beast to Mamma Mia and Hairspray (an interesting case
in itself as it began as a film, was remediated as a musical, then re-mediatized

as a film musical; the result increased it's monetary value every step of the

way), not to mention recent reality television shows that search for the next
stars of Broadway productions of Grease or Legally Blonde, to see that
producers increasingly look to existing media to draw audiences into their
theatres.

These examples of large-scale commercial performances (arena
concerts, Broadway musicals, professional sporting events) are all well and
good, but what about smaller, intimate performances where little if any

amplification or video projections are used? Well, he preempts the reader's

objections by making the point that "mediatization is not just a question of
the employment of media technology" as we've already seen in previous

examples (Auslander, 1999, p. 36). It is also the way in which the process of
indirect mediatization has altered the way audiences approach many live

performances as well as the way presenters package even small scale
productions.

This analysis of the relationship between mediatization and economy
is intriguing and worthy of exploration.

However, to apply economic

thinking to all aspects of our inquiry would be too limiting. He asserts that
live and mediatized forms of performance carry cultural or symbolic capital

(1999, p. 43, 66-67) and frames his whole argument in the domain of "cultural
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economy" which he uses "to describe a realm of inquiry that includes both
the real economic relations among cultural forms, and the relative degrees of

cultural prestige and power enjoyed by different forms" (footnote, p. 1).
While this concept may be a useful analytical tool, it ignores the perspectives
outside of an economic worldview and furthermore assumes that works of art

are products; static items that can be bought and sold. While mediatization

may well commodity otherwise ephemeral performance events, a shift in the
underlying assumption away from art as product to the conception of art as

an experiential process may provide some answers about the role of
performance in a mediatized society.
Media Epistemology

Perhaps the boldest point in Auslander's argument up to this point is

his concept of a media-driven epistemology.

He defines "media

epistemology" as a pre-formed perception of our reality through the
mediation of machines-such as the television and microscope (1999, p. 36).

This epistemology reveals the insidious nature of indirect mediatization as it
works on subconscious (perhaps even pre-consdous) levels to shape our
ways of perceiving our world.

Media Epistemology relates simultaneously to the fact that technical

equipment increasingly dominate ourworldview and the ways we have been
conditioned to perceive the world:

[TJhat the commerdal theatre now frequently presents live
versions of film and television and camera-ready productions of

plays, that live concerts often recreate the imagery of music
videos, that the non-matrixed performing characteristic of avant

garde theatre proved a suitable training ground for television
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and film acting all...has to do with approaches to performance
and characterization, and the mobility and meanings of those
within a particular cultural context, (p. 37)
If I may offer a personal example of this phenomenon: for many years,

I had a rigid preference for recorded music over live recordings. Having
listened (and sung along) to my favorite pop songs over and over again, they

became like good friends of whom I knew every produced sound. However,

listening to a live recording revealed the music to be raw and flawed, with
different cadences, the occasional wrong note, and an unbalanced,

unpolished mix of instrumental sounds. Going to a live concert presented
more of the same: the songs did not sound exactly like they did on the
cassette. It took some time before I began to view this as a positive change;

that the energy of the human (and therefore imperfect) performer was
exhilarating and the changes in the performance reflected a spontaneous

reaction to the particular audience, concert hall, and other circumstances that
are unrepeatable.

Because my first encounter with the artist was through a slick

produced recording, the live performance (or to some extent, the live
recording) became a validation, an authentication of the existence of the

recording. The concert tour supported the CD, not vice versa. I had learned
to listen to music as if it were recorded, and thus expected the live

performance to match that recording, note for note. While maturity helped
me realize the value of a live performance, my initial orientation to music was

that a produced recording should be the standard of quality by which we

judge all other instances of it. This is one example of how the media pervades
and shapes not only our perceptions, but also our expectations.
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This leads Auslander to a postulation that Benjamin's

hypothesis that, in reproduction, "the quality of [the original's] presence is
always depredated" (see above) has become inverted: "The ubiquity of
reproductions of performances of all kinds in our culture has led to the

depredation of live presence," which is addressed "by making the perceptual
experience of the live as much as possible like that of the mediatized, even in

cases where the live event provides its own brand of proximity" (1999, p. 40).
Here, Auslander echoes Barthes when he argues that the lines between

the live and mediatized are becoming increasingly blurred and in such a

space, it is the digital image rather than the live one that becomes the
dominant aesthetic force within mixed media performance:

We now experience such work as a fusion, not a con-fusion, of
realms, a fusion that we see as taking place within a digital
environment that incorporates the live elements as part of its
raw material...in this sense, Dance + Virtual = Virtual, (p. 42)

Like Benjamin's conception that modes of perception are historically

contingent, Auslander believes that liveness is equally controlled by
innovations in technology. Because our culture has become saturated with

digitally-mediated material, such material is "gradually repladng the live
within the cultural economy" (Dixon, p. 124). This view establishes the

meaning of liveness as "historical and contingent rather than determined by
immutable differences" (quoted in Dixon, p 123 [fn44]). This contingent

definition, according to Auslander, means that the relationship between live

performance and mediatized forms must be understood not with the idea of
liveness as "an ontological condition" but that the relationship "needs to be

understood historically and locally, in particular contexts" (p. 62-3). This
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contextuality provides the foundation for Auslander to dismantle the idea
that the ontology of live performance is immutable, an assertion opposite to
many performance theorists.
One such challenger is Peggy Phelan, who presents a polar

opposite of Auslander when she insists on an essentialist ontology of
performance that depends upon its existence in the present place and
moment, echoing Benjamin's argument about aura and authentidty as well as
Brook's definition of theatre.

For Phelan, any attempt at reproduction

"betrays and lessens the promise of [performance's] own ontology" (Dixon, p.
123). Performance is dependent on "a constant state of presence followed by

disappearance," as it is the latter which defines the boundaries of the
performance (p. 126). A supporting voice in this debate is Phaedre Bell, who
sets dnematic representation—whose signifiers are always absent—apart from
live theatre, where signification is dependent on people and objects' full
presence. This distinction leads to "fundamental differences in how we read

and interpret filmic and theatrical signs" (p. 126). Patrice Pavis goes so far as
to suggest that technologies of reproduction not only influence live theatre,
but also contaminate it (p. 124).
Auslander's response is to insist that the digital is the dominant
aesthetic force into which the live is incorporated.

This implies that, in

multimedia art works, film is not read as theatre; rather, the use of film (or

other televisual media) in a live performance transforms the event into

television (ibid, p. 125). In the face of this bold challenge to traditional

notions that live performance has a unique ontology dependent on embodied

presence, a more evolved dialogue is needed. Rather than insist on a polar
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opposition between media and theatre, I accept the redprodty between the
live and mediatized. However, I reject the notion that the digital is dominant

over the live and therefore subsumes it. If the relationship is truly redprocal,
then one form need not dominate the other.
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CHAPTER IV
DEWEY'S AESTHETICS

One of Dewey's concerns was that the speed at which we take in

stimuli and information allows few of these impressions to actually take hold
and lead to a fulfilling experience. And without fulfilling experience, one
cannot live a fully human life; we are not able to flourish. Consider for a
moment the speed at which people lived, the number of stimuli present in the

Chicago of 1934. Now imagine the same dty today.

How many more

impressions are presented to one's perception in a moment? Surely, if Dewey

were transported in time, he would feel bombarded by the sheer volume of
fragmented sensations and information that many of us take for granted as
part of our mediatized world.

The sound bites, logos, catchphrases,

headlines, and 140 character messages that dominate our senses create a

pervasive atmosphere of fragmentation.

By identifying and cultivating a

sense of full experience, we can begin to live a full life. To understand how to
accomplish this, we must first recognize what Dewey means by two distinct
notions: experience as a whole, and the singularity of an experience, or what
he called the "consummatory experience."
Experience

Experience, in general, is characterized by a continuous interaction

between an organism and the other organisms, objects, and activity

surrounding it. Several aspects of this definition are important to unpack,
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including continuity, embodiment, transaction, and situated-ness. First of all,
it is important to recognize that experience is always situated within an
environment; it does not happen in isolation, even when it is perceived as an

internal process. "The idea of environment is a necessity to the idea of

organism, and with the conception of environment comes the impossibility of
considering psychical life as an individual, isolated thing developing in a
vacuum" (in Boydston, vol. 1, p. 56).

Any description of experience,

therefore, needs to account for how it functions in and with natural, cultural,

and sodal environments (Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 1, section 2). Therefore any

component of experienceis a part of an ongoing process, "with the idea of the

organism already dynamically involved with the world" (Alexander 1987,
129). For example, a man building a wall does so for a reason, maybe he
wants to keep animals out of his garden, or perhaps he is employed by a

landscaping company. To build it, he must select the stones needed, then

begin pladng them. The experience of lifting one stone is embedded in and
conditioned by this context.

Disagreeing with the reflex arc model of psychology in vogue during
his lifetime, which asserted that "a passive organism encounters an external

stimulus," which "engenders a sensory and motor response;" Dewey
criticized this view of stimulus-response as fragmented and inadequate

(Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 1, section 2, para. 2). He opted for a view of
continuous interaction that could not be parsed into discreet stimuli and

responses; just as it is embedded in an environment, experience is organic,

redprocal, and cumulative (ibid).

Rather than a view of stimuli and

responses as discreet occurrences, Dewey instead employs the terms "doing"
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and "undergoing" to signify the redprodty of one's action in an environment
and the action of the environment on the organism. The back-and-forth

nature of one's interaction in the world implies an ongoing and adaptive
transaction. For an example of this transactional process we can examine that
of a man lifting a rock:

In consequence he undergoes, suffers, something: the weight,
strain, texture of the surface of the thing lifted. The properties
thus undergone determine further doing. The stone is too
heavy or too angular, not solid enough; or else the properties
undergone show it is fit for the use for which it was intended.
The process continues until a mutual adaptation of the self and
the object emerges and that particular experience comes to a
close. (Dewey, 1934, p. 44)
This rhythm of doing and undergoing creates the possibility for tension and
conflict, but also of equilibrium which "comes about not mechanically and

inertly but out of, and because of tension" (p. 14). When equilibrium is
reached, an adaptation is made and future action is altered. When it is not

reached, the experience is unfulfilled. This can be the result of any number of
internal or external distractions or of lethargy.
The transaction between organism and environment is also dynamic

and contextual. Depending on how a moment is framed, a stimulus could

also be a response and vice versa (Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 1, section 2). Such
a conception rejects the idea that experience is strictly cognitive; instead

Dewey seeks to BOTH ground experience in the body and the organism in

nature

thereby dissolving dualities of body/mind and organism/

environment.

This is an ecological model: "mind, body, and world are

mutually created by their ongoing interaction" (chap. 1, section 2, para. 12).
In this perspective, the mind and body are coordinated in one organic
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"sensori-motor drcuit" which both undertakes perception of the world and
acts within it (Hildebrand, 2008). When a child beholds water in the pool on

a hot day, he does so within the context of ongoing activity, out of which
emerges an impulse to jump. This compulsion is more than just a motor
response because it began with an act of seeing, which is simultaneously an
intentional act and physical stimulation of the eye. One reaches out not as a

response in itself, but as a reaching-guided-by-seeing (ibid).
Furthermore, boundaries between the environment and organism are

dissolved because they are "mutually implicated at each moment; they are

aspects of one situation fundamentally related through the act" (Alexander,
p. 135). The act, according to Dewey is the basic unit of experience, initiated
by impulse and unfolding over time. Impulse is rooted in instinct, it is a

spontaneous and creative response to the tensive nature of the situation, as
discussed previously.

It is the phase of the act "in which the need for

reconstructing the situation is apparent, and one seeks the best response" (p.
139). If, once in the water, our young hero feels it is icy cold, the impulse hits

him quickly—through sensori-motor coordination—to jump out. Herein lies
the potential to be changed by the experience, to learn from it.
Learning and Growth
Hildebrand summarizes Dewey's process of learning as "movement

from an initial disequilibrium (confusion, doubt) toward equilibrium

(satisfaction, knowledge). The learner is not an empty vessel or a wax tablet,

'impressed' by discrete and external stimuli, but an agent actively engaged
with her environment and growing insofar as she frames and uses events in
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experience" (2008, chap. 1, section 2, para. 7). The discomfort of the cold
water makes the young boy see the water differently and he will likely
approach it with more apprehension next time.

His habits will be changed

through a readjustment of the situation. A habit, for Dewey gives structure to

experience as "a cumulative linking of acts" (chap. 1, section 2, para. 15). To
be able to swim, one needs to be involved in thousands of acts which

accumulate into a full activity, at which point we say we have learned to
swim.

It should now be apparent that the body-mind is an integrated whole

engaged in the act, and it is the act which provides a context for meaning. The
creation of meaning is an active process and accomplished "by observing
how instincts are built into personal habits and, more generally, how they are

valued by the sodal and cultural contexts in which they function" (chap. 1,
section 2, para. 9). Thus we see that meaning is necessarily sodal because it is
arrived at through symbolic communication within our sodal environments:
"individuals become aware of their individuality only through a sodal

context and the ability to regard themselves from the sodal perspective...

Meaning is the very struggle to make the world coherent; it is the ongoing

process of trying to make sense.

This is a communally shared task"

(Alexander, p. xix). When experience becomes endowed with meaning, it has
reached a point of consummation, what Dewey calls an experience.
AN Experience

Zeal for doing, lust for action, leaves many a person, espedally
in this hurried and impatient human environment in which we
live, with experience of an almost incredible paudty, all on the
surface. No one experience has a chance to complete itself
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because something else is entered upon so speedily. Resistance
is treated as an obstruction to be beaten down, not as an
invitation to reflection. An individual comes to seek,

unconsdously even more than by deliberate choice, situations in
which he can do the most things in the shortest time. (Dewey,
1934, p. 44-5)
Perhaps it is the last sentence in the quote above that strikes us most as a
truth of contemporary life. Don't we often get caught up in multi-tasking,
attempting to "do the most things in the shortest time," even at the same

time? The speed at which computers operate has become the standard by
which we measure human capadty. Turkle speaks to this in Alone Together:
"overwhelmed by the pace that technology makes possible, we think about
how new, more effident technologies might help dig us out. But new devices

encourage ever-greater volume and velodty" (2011, p. 280). However, to
insist, as Dewey does, that a life worth living is one that makes the most of

the potential for full, enriching experiences in every moment of our lives is a
bold yet highly valuable existential and moral statement. When we recognize

that "present life's dysfunctional routines," as Hildebrand puts it, deaden
"the live creature" and create "a profoundly felt loss of meaning, making

these routines more aesthetic can awaken us to the possibility of a better

future (2008, chap. 6, Condusion, para. 3).
To understand the aesthetic dimension of consummatory experience,

let us turn to Dewey's own examples:

A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a
problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a
situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of
chess, carrying on a conversation, writing a book, or taking part
in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a
consummation and not a cessation. (1934, p. 35)

These examples illustrate the prerequisites of an experience: "to undergo a
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series of events which hang together (have unity), exhibit character (have a
theme or pervasive quality), and end with some drama (consummating, not

just terminating)" (Hildebrand, 2008, section 3, para. 6). A consummatory
experience is distinguished by a qualitative unity, the quality pervades an
experience, provides it with a sense of wholeness: "in going over an

experience in mind after its occurrence, we may find that one property rather
than another was sufficiently dominant so that it characterizes the experience

as a whole" (Dewey 1934, p. 37).

imaginative in nature.

This quality is often emotional or

Our young hero, situated as he is in a sodal

environment, has witnessed someone doing an aquatic flip and deddes he
wants to do it as well. His determination is the emotional quality that drives

the various attempts at the summersault.

Once he has mastered it, the

experience has reached its feels complete; the connection between doing and
undergoing, or one's action and the consequences are coordinated until a
mutual adaptation is reached that brings the experience to a consummatory

close. The unity of his striving is what drives the experience toward an

endpoint, and endows the experience with what Dewey acknowledged as the
aesthetic dimension. It is this dimension that gives an experience "its name,

that meal, that storm, that rupture of friendship" (p. 37).

Experiences lacking in qualitative unity and consummation, or

"anesthetic" experiences are too oftenassumed to be the norm (Dewey, 1934).
There are many things that limit experiences by impeding our ability to

perceive the relations of doing and undergoing: imbalances occur when we
move so fast from one activity to another we cut short the completion of any

particular act (imbalance toward doing) or when we daydream and receive
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impressions that flow through our minds without taking root (imbalance
toward undergoing) (p. 44-45).

Hildebrand elaborates on this model,

establishing three categories of limiting forces: "(1) interruption (phone calls,

computerized alarms, advertising, or even a sneeze during a romantic kiss);
by (2) hyperactivity (overcaffeination, incessant multi-tasking, demanding
bosses); and by (3) passivity (habits of laziness, procrastination, the desire to
'be entertained')" (2008, chap. 6, section3, para. 9). In contrast, we only truly

have an experience when it is fully and consdously embodied.

When

experience is fully embodied, we live "in the moment," follow it through to
its end, and endow experience with its aesthetic value.
Thinking Like an Artist

[T]he origin of art lies ultimately in this very moment of being
fully alive. (Alexander, 1987, p. 194)

The project of reconnecting art and aesthetic experience with everyday
life begins with understanding the purpose of art which, "in Dewey's view, is
to create espedally aesthetic experiences" (Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 6, section

4, para. 1). To do so requires a partidpatory transaction that opens up
another set of dualisms which Dewey takes upon himself to deconstruct;

artist/spectator and artistic/aesthetic, both of which are concerned with an

opposition of arfs production and perception. For an art product to be both
artistic and aesthetic—a merging Dewey laments the English language does
not accommodate in one word—the artist must embody "in himself the

attitude of the perceiver while he works" and likewise, the appredator must

imagine how the work was made to perceive what the artist was attempting
to achieve (1934, p. 48,54).
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A painter plying his craft "must consdously undergo the effect of his
every brush stroke or he will not be aware of what he is doing and where his
work is going. Moreover, he has to see each particular connection of doing

and undergoing in relation to the whole he desires to produce" (Dewey, 1934,
p. 45). Art is a process of communication; as such, artists create with the end
in mind, knowing it will have an audience and crafting the work so that

audience has a particular experience. The artist is set apart from others
because she is "not only espedally gifted in powers of execution but in

unusual sensitivity to the qualities of things" (p. 49). In the act of creation, the
artist applies these "powers of execution" through their chosen materials,

while "attempting to form a sympathetic and imaginative projection of what

appredators will experience later on" (Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 6, section 4,
para. 3). Likewise, the appredator is called upon to recreate the impulsion
and process of the artist.

Dewey offers us an example: when the Parthenon was built, it was
created within a context, fulfilling a need for the Athenian community.

Though it served a strictly functional and spiritual purpose at the time (the
Greeks thought of architecture as a craft, rather than art), it is now revered as
a piece of enduring art. To approach the Parthenon as a work of art, one
must keep the original context in mind, remembering "what the people into
whose lives it entered had in common...with people in our own homes and

our own streets" (1934, p. 5). To fully experience an art product aesthetically

is to grasp its significance within the context of which it was created: the
individual and community experience. As Dewey puts it "without an act of
recreation the object is not perceived as a work of art. The artist selected,
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simplified, clarified, abridged and condensed according to his interest. The
beholder must go through these operations according to his point of view and

interest" (p. 54). This definition of work of art as process is further explained
as a collaboration, through reconstruction, the perceiver of an artwork is also
a creator.
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CHAPTER V
ALTERNATIVE PHENOMENOLOGIES

"My body is a movement toward the world and the world my
body's point of support." (Merleau-Ponty, in Carman &
Hansen, p. 271)
Let us now return to the debate over the live and mediatized to see

how Dewey might contribute to this conversation. As we can now discern,
this topic tends to lead theorists to make hyperbolic exclamations and dodge
final answers to the question of ontology.
phenomenological exploration to assist us.

Dixon suggests we turn to a
He challenges Auslander's

condusion which removes the spatial, physical presence of performers from

the equation, by stating that (at least from a perceptual standpoint), "liveness
has more to do with time and "now-ness" than with the corporeality or

virtuality of subjects being observed" (2007, p. 127). While this perspective
simplifies the problem of liveness, it also oversimplifies it, because in

actuality, reception modes differ for spectators of live and recorded

performances. They are watched in different ways.... Watching film, video,
and digital media is a more voyeuristic experience than watching live

performance, since in the literal sense of the word, the onlooker is looking
from a position without fear of being seen by the watched (p. 130). Perceptive
senses are engaged differently in each case, and are affected by the presence
or absence of live performers.

In her chapter titled "Embodiment and Presence," (in Krasner & Saltz,
2006), Suzanne M. Jaeger seeks to affirm the ontology of presence as a real,

lived phenomenon by arguing against postructuralists like Derrida and
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Auslander who "reject the possibility of any singularly meaningful

experience of self-presence" (p. 122). She critiques how Derrida and his
followers, spedfically Auslander who has applied Derridean thought to
performance, apply a micrological, linguistic approach that assumes what is
true for language is generalizable to all forms of experience. She asserts that
"linguistic accounts of meaning by themselves fail to acknowledge how

aspects of the object and of the environment contribute to the synthesis of
perception" (p. 135). To Derrida, meaning is the result of re-contextualization

whenever words or gestures are repeated in new contexts; therefore signified

meanings are always absent, as is the subject (p. 127-8). Following this line of
thinking, communication is based on differences which in themselves are

nothing and therefore cannot be present. To further explain this denial of self-

presence in Derrida's overly formalistic mode, Jaeger quotes Joan Scott who
states that, "it is no longer individuals who have experience, but subjects who

are constituted through experience.... Experience is a linguistic event" (p. 128).
Although this theory seems to exclude the possibility of embodied presence
as a meaningful experience, Peggy Phelan's contribution opens up such a

possibility. Phelan suggests that performance is transformed into something
different if it is recorded because it can only exist in the present and that it

"becomes itself through disappearance" (p. 129). It is this ephemerality that

leaves open the possibility for meaning outside of the text, and thus outside
of Derrida's linguistic analysis. It is, in fact, the very materiality of the

physically present performer and spectator that gives performance a unique
ontology.

Jaeger corroborates Phelan's analysis by insisting that the investment
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of a performer in the moment is "always concretely visible" (p. 125). A
recognition of this sort of embodied presence is a feature lacking from
Auslander's theory. In the process of making his argument, he "disregards

the importance of the body" while admitting "that although mediatized
performances engage all of the same senses as live performances, they may

well engage the senses differently" (ibid), which leaves open the possibility
for an ontology of presence. To lay out such an ontology, Jaeger rejects the
formalism and generalization in Derrida's ideas and develops a framework
for understanding meaningful experience which focuses on the ways in

which our senses are engaged phenomenologically (p. 131). She does this
through the perceptual theory of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, whose work closely
aligns with Dewey, as we shall see.
The Body in Space

While Derrida and Auslander are focused solely on linguistic meaning,

Merleau-Ponty provides an alternative view of meaning, which utilizes

Dewey's model (Alexander, p. 129). Merleau-Ponty builds on Dewey's bodymind coordination and develops it into "bodily powers of perception" that

indude the physical, sodal, and emotional in addition to the cognitive and

linguistic, all of which he refers to as "modalities of perception" which are

intentionally connected to features in our environment (Jaeger, p. 132). Such
modalities do not function in isolation, but rather interact and influence one

another in a process he referred to as "synesthetic perception" wherein the
object of our perception is the culmination of all powers of perception at our

disposal (ibid). This returns us to the idea that perception and the meanings
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we attribute to the world are not strictly a matter of cognition, but are
products of a complex interplay of physically constituted perceptual faculties.
Merleau-Ponty's epistemology depends on embodied perception and
one's presence to an object in an environment (p. 134). He asserts that we

experience the interplay of our various "powers of perception" as a unity, or
"body schema" whereby "sensations are laden or 'pregnant' with meanings
that remain hidden until given representation" (p. 134). We actively seek to
uncover meanings, motivated by the fact that our perception will always be

incomplete because the perceptual material of any environment or activity is
limitless and as one being, we can only take in so much.

The unity

experienced is thus a "function of the complex, active, embodied engagement
with the specific features of the environment" and therefore has both

temporal and spatial dimensions (p. 135). Our body schema synthesizes our
perceptual powers through a dynamic interaction with the environment in a

rhythmic unfolding as we engage with the object of our perception (p. 135-6).
Each person, due to the uniqueness of our bodies and histories, has a
particular style—or recognizable pattern—of engaging with the world. Our

habits of perception are mutable by nature because of their connection with
the environment, which is in continual flux; "the unity of the bodily schema is

therefore open and limitless" (p. 137).

Presence, here, is explained as a reconfiguration of the body schema, as
a "perceptual openness" to stimuli, and therefore represents "the possibility
of transformation in familiar, habituated, and sodally entrenched patterns

through which one experiences the world" (p. 137-9).

Because the

particularities of the environment have an effect on our style or "manner of
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being in the world" (p. 138), we may critique Auslander's dismissal of
ontological distinctions between live and mediatized performances: While
the same perceptual faculties may be engaged in the viewing of either form,

they are certainly engaged in different ways as the body schema is
transformed by the unique type of engagement offered by the type of media
used and the form of liveness experienced. If related to another through

email, video chat, or by telephone, we will call on a different configuration of

our perceptual schema and the style ofhow we relate through a medium will
change with the medium itself.
What Dewey Offers

Several features of Merleau-Ponty's perspective overlap with and

expand onDewey's: the situated-ness ofthe perceiver in an environment, the
connection of mind-body perceptual faculties, and the unity of a perceptive

experience. All of which supports the potential of embodied aesthetic
experience to enrich our lives.

Dewey's concept of embodied, consummatory experience is of use in
our discourse on mediatization not only through because of its contribution

to aesthetic philosophy, but also through its metaphysics and its implications
for the ethical formation of the individual and community. We have already

touched on the metaphysical importance, namely how "aesthetic experience

exemplifies the most vivid and condensed example of experience at its most

integrated...Such a degree of fulfillment represents life-including intellectual
inquiry~at its most satisfactory" (Hildebrand, 2008, chap. 6, Introduction,
para. 4). This dimension of Dewey's model provides an overarching
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contribution to contemporary thought that encompasses other, more practical
applications which we will explore in more detail as they comment on and
relate to our discourse on mediatization.

Aesthetics and Media

As an aesthetic philosophy for the modern world, Dewey's model can

provide a framework for exploring the role of presence in performance and
its relationship to media. Dewey, unlike Benjamin, did not make any explidt
comment about the authentidty of a work of art as an attribute of its

presence; he was much more concerned with the presence of a perceiver and

their ability to attend to a work of art—most of his examples of art objects
were paintings, sculpture, and architecture.

However, he did write

extensively about the materials, or media employed in art-making and their
expressivity.

Dewey briefly articulates the difference between art forms that utilize

the artisfs body as medium (the "automatic arts" including dancing, singing,
dancing, story-telling, tattooing, etc.), and those which utilize materials apart

from the body ("shaping arts" such as sculpting, painting, weaving, etc).
Even after making this distinction, he reminds us that since art is a human

endeavor, all art is, at some point, subject to the movements of the human

body (with the exception of those objects create by machine). "Something of
the rhythm of vital natural expression, something as it were of dancing and

pantomime, must go into carving, painting, and making statues, planning
buildings, and writing stories" (1934, p. 228). Thus, the distinction between
automatic and shaping arts is a continuum rather than dualism, a theme that
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will surface again soon.

He goes on to condemn any attempt to rank the arts into a hierarchy of
classes as "out of place and stupid", insisting that "each medium has its own
efficacy and value" (p. 227). This supports the claim that mediatized arts
exist on a level playing field with live performance yet denies Auslander &
Birringers' daim to digital media's dominance. Can digital media still be
considered works of art with equal authenticity to the "live" or present art
work?

The answer is complicated and involves an evaluation of the

medium's expressive properties.

In his discussion of media, Dewey provides criteria for assessing
artwork. By this he means the ability of the art object to create an opportunity

for meaningful aesthetic experience (which constitutes the "work of art").
This expressivity is accomplished through the artisfs selection of all available
stimuli, or "energies," as Dewey calls them, and ordering of this material

through the art object in ways that interest or engage us. Technical mastery
over one's media marks artistic creation, and thus a "true artisf who, in

Dewey's view "sees and feels in terms of his medium and the one who has

learned to perceive esthetically emulates the operation" (p. 200). Note that
his definition of an artist here explidtly includes the perceiver, reinforcing the
idea of audience as active collaborator and artwork as process. Technique

and intent also play a role in this definition. One may create (or see) a work
of art in virtually any object if one enters into its creation (or reception) with
aesthetic intent.

Dewey also distinguishes between expressive media and materials

which are merely "vehicles" for art works.

"What makes a material a
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medium is that it is used to express a meaning which is other than that which
it is in virtue of its bare physical existence" (1934, p. 201).

Musical

instruments, for example, deliver sound to our ears. However, because they

have the capadty for expression, they are more than simple vehides in the
way that a phonograph is a vehicle for delivering sonic art works to our ears

(to use Dewey's now antiquated example). Allergic as he is to dualisms,
Dewey posits this distinction as a continuum rather than an opposition. For
instance, the printed book began as a vehicle for literature; however, over
time it has influenced the presentation and form of literary works through
page size, typography, and illustration. The same could be said of digital
media: though photography, film, and later video began simply as ways to

reproduce, document, and present images of the world, the expressive
capadty of each medium was quickly put to use with attention to technical
elements such as composition, light, shape, editing, and other properties. Of
course, just because a medium has potential for expression, does not mean it
is art.

To return to our original example, when the boy flipping in the pool is

recorded on a smartphone which is immediately sent to others with no
editing or thought given to the framing, composition, or lighting, it can be

agued that this is not an example of art because those properties of the video
which maximize its capadty for meaningful aesthetic experience have not
been intentionally utilized. The intent of the videographer was simply to
document and share a fleeting moment. On the other hand, since aesthetic

experience is inherently transactional and collaborative, the perceiver

practiced in aesthetic inquiry might see in the video artistic intent and attend
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to it as aesthetic experience in all its fullness.

One who has learned to

perceive aesthetically may see art in any medium.

While this is an

exceedingly important point for moral development and human growth, let
us take a moment to consider the various qualities of aesthetic experience,
and how they relate to presence in liveness.

We can extrapolate Dewey's discussion of the phonograph as vehide
and not the art objert itself to other modes of reproduction and delivery:

posters, Compact Discs (or mp3 files), Blu-ray discs, and other forms of
reproduction would fall into the category of vehicles and as such, provide
access to a work of art, but do not constitute the object of art with which we
have an aesthetic experience. Dewey is concerned with the nature of
experience in the here and now; for him the present moment is encapsulated in
the work of art as intermediary of communication between artist and

perceiver (1934, p. 123). We have already established that, as embodied
schema, perceptual faculties are engaged differently in encounters with live
versus mediated or mediatized art objects, therefore it can also be argued that

a live instance of art provides an opportunity for a more complete aesthetic
experience.

While a poster of the Mona Lisa or a recording of the

Brandenburg Concertos allow us access to enduring art products (now) with
which we can have a meaningful aesthetic experience, the experience of the

works live (in the present here and now) will engage more of our perceptual
faculties and thus provide a more complete aesthetic experience.
As mentioned above, the aesthetically-oriented perceiver can make an

aesthetic object out of most any object. So, the viewer of the online video of

our boy's aquatic feat may be able to fully attend to it and the experience of
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watching the video may be fully aesthetic. Yet, that same person at the pool
experiences it fully embedded in the environment to which it belongs, with
all of the accompanying birdsong, hot air, and energy of emotion electrifying
the scene. All of these elements congeal in the perceiver's body schema to
create a more full experience, endowed with a greater degree of aesthetic
quality.

Dismantling the Beauty Parlor of Civilization
As previously discussed, Auslander's ideological tendency to think of
art in terms of commodified products limits their use to a consumerist

worldview which values art objects only in terms of their market or sodal
capital. A Deweyan approach would dismantle this idea; in order to bring
together the world of art and everyday life, the view of art as products to be
bought, sold, and displayed needs to be reconsidered in light of their capadty

for meaningful experience. In Hildebrand's view, "the more invasive and
magnetic the pull of commodification and trade upon an indigenous art-

making community, the more rapidly the intimate and sodal functions
responsible for art deteriorate. In place of those organic functions there is
imposed an impersonal world market which reduces artworks" to nothing
more than instances of fine art (2008, chap. 6, section 2, para. 14).

Dewey's views on commerce and mechanization were certainly a
product of his time as industry was in full swing and film itself was a
relatively new medium. However, several statements give us dues to the

relationship of reproductive technologies in aesthetic experience. First of all,
he believed strongly in the ability of sdence to bring humans doser to the
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natural world, which "has always been the actuating spirit of art," thus the
quest of sdence is brought closer to that of art (Dewey, 1934, p. 339). And so,
he believed that any new kinds of experiences, forms of observation, and
ways of engaging with the world can and should be integrated into the artmaking and appredating process. The growth of humanity is ample ground
for artistic exploration and opens up possibilities for expression and
experience. This view could support the integration of new technologies into

forms of performance, whether they be artistic or mundane.
Secondly, he believed that mass production reinforces a long-held
belief in the separation of the fine arts and useful craft (the latter of which
carried significantly less esteem, historically speaking.) He states that "the
mechanical stands at the pole opposite to that of the esthetic, and production

of goods is now mechanical;" a process which stole the "liberty of choice"
from craftsman and thus diminished the ability to endow such produds with

potential for aesthetic experience (ibid, p. 341). He does, however allow that
mechanically-produced objects have form that can only be viewed as
aesthetic when the object fits into "a larger experience," and so the larger
environment (also transformed by industry, or more recently the information-

economy) is implicated in the figuring of aesthetic placement of industrially

designed and created objects (p. 342). He points out, as I have earlier, that
"the habits of the eye as a medium of perception are being slowly altered in
being accustomed to the shapes that are typical of industrial products and to

the objects that belong to urban as distinct from rural life. The colors and

planes to which the organism habitually responds develop new material for
interest" (ibid).
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This trend has become even more apparent in the age of the computer,
when you consider the aesthetic considerations of Apple in the design of their
devices which has extended to most if not all forms of mobile devices.

Certainly we are now accustomed to a world where products manufactured

for functional purposes are also designed to be aesthetically pleasing. In spite
of this, we must examine whether these objects are contributing to an
environment that encourages fulfillment and growth through aesthetic
experience or if the beautiful design merely encourages a system of commerce
based on what is lacking in our experience and the constant desire for more.

We hunger after an iPod or smartphone because of ifs beauty andfunction; it
promises to fill a void in our lives, but will it lead to more complete
experiences or will it only enter us into a cyde of more lack and want? I
submit that the integration of aesthetic design into consumer culture works
counter to the aims of aesthetic experience outlined by Dewey. These objects
become elevated by consumer culture in much the same way that a museum
elevates "fine art" and robs the objeds of their capadty for engagement in

future experience. In fad, he condudes Art as Experience with a virtual call to
arms in a "revolution" that requires "affecting the imagination and emotions

of man" until "the values that lead to production and intelligent enjoyment of

art [are] incorporated into the system of sodal relationships" (p. 344). Only
when this incorporation is complete will the projed of Deweyan aesthetics
reach ifs full potential for political and moral transformation.
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CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION:

IMPLICATIONS FOR AN ARTFUL LIFE

A work of art accentuates this quality of being a whole and of
belonging to the larger, all-indusive, whole which is the
universe in which we live (Dewey, 1934, p. 195)
This thesis began with a statement on the value of theatre to everyday
human experience and attaining the fullness of life. According to Robert
Woodruff the art of theatre, if translated into everyday life, helps us grow as
individuals and as a community. To do so we must learn to attend to others,

engage in reflective practice, and understand one's connection to the larger
community, all skills brought to life through successful engagement with art

(as formulated by Dewey) which can teach us to live an artful life. Attention
to others in the here and now is a central theme in Dewey's theory of

experience, and as such provides practical tools to enact Woodruff's directive.
In learning to attend to theatre, we pradice cultivating full aesthetic

experience, which can in turn teach us to enhance our everyday experiences

through "attention to a present situation, adjustment and growth in light of
that situation, and the harmonious unfolding of that situation with the

funding of past experience and present potentials" (Stroud, 2011, p. 73). We
learn to identify and select the elements in our environments to lend our
attention. In doing so, we wake up to the possibilities implidt in our world.
We can see "how life's harried pace fragments attention, defeats natural

impulses toward inquiry, and coerces the worship of dangerously simplistic
effidendes" and how our reactions to harried life - often retreats into passive
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recreation or hyped-up levels of activity - also fail to produce genuinely
meaningful aesthetic experiences" (Hildebrand 2008, chap. 6, Condusion,
para. 2).

Mediatized images and forms of communication need not displace or
replace our temporal-spatial presence to one another.

With aesthetic

development comes the ability to recognize fragmentary and dysfunctional
experiences for what they are, to separate them out from more meaningful
aspeds of life, and attend to them with greater appredation, engagement, and
fulfillment. This has implications for artists, critics, and educators as well as

educational institutions. With aesthetic education, students are given the

tools to increase their ability to focus, choose what interactions are deserving
of attention, and develop an awareness of their place in the world and how to

be more fully engaged in it. Artists and critics can also work as public
educators, helping the general public to access artworks and learn how to
engage with them. To do this, we need a more thorough consideration of
how this philosophy might be put into practice through the methods of
aesthetic education.
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